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Minding the Gap: Extending Adult Jury Trial 
Rights to Adolescents While Maintaining a 
Childhood Commitment to Rehabilitation 
Jennifer M. Segadelli1 
We need a new definition of neighborhood, community, society. . 
. . We all need a definition of responsibility. . . . We need another 
perspective on the possibilities.2 
INTRODUCTION 
Notwithstanding a few cases to the contrary, nearly all states have held 
that in the absence of a state statute, a juvenile may not demand that his or 
her delinquency proceeding be determined by a jury.3 The Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution grants the accused “in all 
criminal prosecutions . . . the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed.”4 In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, Justice Blackmun, writing for 
the plurality, declined to extend the right to a jury trial in juvenile criminal 
proceedings in order to uphold the hallmarks of restoration, compassion, 
and rehabilitation that have set aside the juvenile system from the adult 
system since its inception.5 But in the forty years since Justice Blackmun’s 
opinion in McKeiver, has legislative escalation of significant punitive 
consequences imposed in juvenile sentences eroded these hallmarks? If so, 
does this escalation elevate the importance of acknowledging the right for 
an accused juvenile to demand the jury trial afforded to adults who are 
prosecuted in a criminal justice system primarily focused on punishment, 
not rehabilitation, as the goal? 
In a recent Kansas Supreme Court decision, juvenile defendant L.M.6 
sought review of the Court of Appeals decision affirming the district court’s 
finding of aggravated sexual battery and being a minor in possession of 
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alcohol. L.M. claims that he should have had the right to a jury trial and that 
the changes in the Kansas juvenile judicial procedures required review of 
constitutional construction precluding juveniles from such a right.7 On June 
20, 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court agreed and held that the changes to the 
juvenile justice system have “eroded the benevolent parens patriae8 
character that distinguished it from the adult criminal system,”9 and 
“because the juvenile justice system is now patterned after the adult 
criminal system, . . . the changes have superseded the McKeiver and 
Findlay courts’ reasoning and those decisions are no longer binding 
precedent for us to follow.”10 
The holding in L.M.’s case overruled Findlay v. State, a twenty-four- 
year-old precedent that held that juveniles were not entitled to a jury trial.11 
The lone dissenter in L.M. was Chief Justice Kay McFarland, a former 
juvenile court judge; Justice McFarland voiced concern in her dissent that 
the majority decision put Kansas out of alignment with other states, nearly 
all of which adhere to the belief that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Federal Constitution do not protect or extend a right to a jury trial to 
juveniles.12 
The question that arises in the L.M. case and other juvenile cases is 
whether the hallmarks of compassion and rehabilitation have already been 
lost in the juvenile justice system. If they have, particularly as we move 
more toward treatment of juveniles as adults, can the right to a trial by jury 
justly be withheld? Or by granting that right, do we risk turning a 
rehabilitative and compassionate system into a fully adversarial process 
associated with adulthood, the very result Justice Blackmun cautioned 
against? 
This article argues that the ideas of a constitutional right to a jury trial 
and commitments to rehabilitation need not be mutually exclusive; rather, 
expansion of established programs has shown that adolescents can be 
afforded equivalent constitutional rights while guarding the compassion and 
rehabilitation focus that so evidently sets the juvenile system apart from the 
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adult system. Adolescents, a very vulnerable group lost between childhood 
and adulthood, should have the right to a jury trial and other constitutional 
protections without the compromise of the juvenile justice system. 
Promotion of a constitutional right need not make the entire juvenile justice 
system defunct. 
This article explores how well-established “teen courts” may be 
expanded and used as a model for full implementation of jury trials in 
adolescent court proceedings. Part I provides a background to modern 
juvenile justice models by exploring changing concepts of child welfare, the 
evolution of the juvenile justice system, the modern juvenile justice system, 
and the expansion of constitutionally protected rights to juveniles. Part II 
describes the history, development, methodology, and innovation of 
Washington State’s juvenile justice system. Part III emphasizes the 
importance of jury trials, not only in American history and modern society, 
but the particular importance of a jury trial to adolescent offenders. 
Next, Part IV discusses the importance of rehabilitation in the juvenile 
justice system including the important distinction of childhood, the danger 
of losing adolescents in the legal system, and the importance of developing 
a unique approach to adolescence jurisprudence. Part V explores the teen 
court model, specifically the innovation of Washington State’s teen court 
model and the adoption of these models as an opportunity to extend to 
juveniles the right to a jury trial without impinging on the uniqueness of the 
juvenile justice system. Finally, Part VI concludes that adolescent offenders 
have had the worst of both worlds for far too long, and that the only way to 
address the unique developmental stage of adolescence in the legal system 
is to incorporate adult protections with childhood rehabilitation and 
compassion. 
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I. HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE 
PROGRESSION OF JUVENILE RIGHTS 
Prior to 1899, when Illinois adopted the first juvenile court, statutes and 
regulations specifically aimed at juvenile offenders were nearly unheard 
of.13 The groundwork laid by Illinois’s juvenile justice system was quickly 
and almost universally accepted, and by 1925, every state except Maine and 
Wyoming had some system or model for addressing juvenile offenders that 
was distinct and separate from adult criminal proceedings.14 The new 
approach to juvenile justice “envisioned treating juveniles in a manner 
different from adult criminals and focused on rehabilitating juveniles rather 
than punishing them.”15 This section explores changing ideas of child 
welfare through history, the introduction of the first juvenile courts and 
their progression to the modern juvenile justice system, and the expansion 
of constitutional rights to juveniles through time. 
A. Changing Concepts of Child Welfare Through Time 
The development of American policy toward juveniles can aptly be 
described as a dichotomy between two attitudes, both of which historically 
dominated social thought at different times, and both of which shaped the 
modern juvenile justice system—fear of children, and fear for children.16 
While the American rhetoric has always emphasized an attitude of child-
centeredness, the reality of employing child-centeredness into practice is 
much more complex and is critical to understanding the development of 
legal attitudes and policies toward juveniles.17 
The primary disagreements have been about the nature and legitimacy of 
the parental, the community, and the state interest in children, and the role 
of children in society.18 Much of the formative thought on the matter is 
fueled by the belief that children are fundamentally different than adults and 
that they are helpless and dependent on their parents and the state for 
everything from survival to protection.19 The position children hold in 
society at any time is defined by a compromise between a set of society’s 
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ideals and the actual experiences of children in their social setting at any 
given time. Between 1820 and 1935, two distinct periods of child welfare 
existed, and the shifting values of these periods help illuminate the advent 
of the juvenile justice system.20 Throughout history, families have been and 
remain the primary welfare institution in the United States; however, that 
role began to change as concern arose about the failure of many families to 
provide for their children.21 The welfare of children then became a state 
policy of social action, and states are now the greatest external force for the 
assistance of children.22 
1. Child Welfare Between the Early Nineteenth Century and the End of 
the Civil War 
Child welfare between the early nineteenth century and the end of the 
Civil War was dominated by fear for children.23 Child welfare policies and 
institutions became a distinct part of society for the first time in the United 
States,24 born largely out of the breakdown of the family unit as society’s 
sole child welfare provider and the development of alternative child welfare 
institutions such as schools and reformatories.25 Debates during this time 
occurred over individual morality and responsibility, and the role of 
children, parents, and institutions—namely, legitimacy and opportunity for 
institutionalizing delinquent children.26 For the first time, lines were drawn 
between public and private control of children, and a lasting distinction 
emerged between children and adults in legal theory and social reform.27 
2. Child Welfare Between the Late Nineteenth Century and the Early 
Twentieth Century 
By the 1870s, much of the old system’s view of child welfare remained 
firmly in place, but growing concerns about the Industrial Revolution led to 
an increase in fear of children.28 Several factors contributed to the fear of 
children, including further breakdown in family structure brought on by 
rising divorce rates, increased population of women entering the workforce 
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and seeking education, lower marriage rates among educated women, 
growing poverty, increased juvenile delinquency, and lower birth rates 
among middle and upper class families and increased birth rates among 
lower class and immigrant families, leading to concern about the fate of 
children.29 Much of the debate was fueled by a fear that children of 
working-class and immigrant families would “undermine” society if left 
without institutional intervention.30 
The juvenile court first created by the Illinois State Legislature in 1899 
was “probably the most prominent of child-saving institutions.”31 There was 
a waning faith in self-autonomy and personal responsibility, and a growing 
faith in institutionalization of child welfare, making this movement known 
as “child-saving.”32 Change in child welfare policy was promulgated by the 
assumption that childhood was a “distinctive and vulnerable stage of life,” 
inherently different than adulthood.33 The definition and legitimacy of 
childrearing needed to be expanded, thus challenging the existing roles of 
parents, children, and the state; the hope was to preserve childhood through 
adolescence by strengthening children’s dependence on adults and society, 
and by removing them from inevitable adult roles.34 
By the 1930s, the United States had an established system of child 
welfare that had been developed and modified over a decade marked by 
policy changes toward children.35 Throughout that time, although it could 
be agreed upon that the welfare of children was of central importance to the 
state, no consensus could be reached as to method or policy—that is, 
whether children were better served if the state aided the family unit, or 
whether children and the family unit could only be served by eliminating 
the inequities and injustices prevalent in society and institutions.36 Court 
decisions have stated, “As a result of disagreements over the place of 
children in American society, child welfare practices and beliefs helped 
rearrange and redefine the relationship among children, parents, the state, 
and civil society.”37 
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B. The Evolution of Juvenile Courts and the Modern American Juvenile 
Court 
When the first juvenile court was founded, its envisioned goals were 
removal of the juvenile from the harsh criminal justice system and 
protection of adolescence through closed hearings and confidential 
records—a vision that took many years, and in some states, decades, to 
achieve.38 The juvenile court system, therefore, did not emerge in its 
perfection upon creation, but rather it was a “work in progress” and many of 
its hallmarks and defining features were additions and responses as the 
system grew and developed.39 
Since their inception, juvenile courts have been a statutory creation, 
which means they can be altered and amended at will, making them distinct 
from other court systems.40 Founders of the juvenile courts believed that the 
creation of a juvenile justice and court system would be “one of their 
generation’s major contributions to the ongoing historical process of 
improving the status of children in American society.”41 By 1923, the idea 
of a juvenile court, distinct and removed from adult proceedings, was 
deeply entrenched in American society.42 The nation agreed that the 
juvenile justice system should have broad and exclusive jurisdiction over 
youth until the age of eighteen, private hearings, confidential records, 
detention, probation, individual treatment, and a focus on rehabilitation.43 
The juvenile court system, at its inception, was founded on informality 
and sympathy; great effort was taken to remove the juvenile justice system 
from mainstream legal institutions.44 Since the late 1970s, and increasing 
through the 1990s, there has been a growing trend to criminalize the 
juvenile justice system and transfer more cases out of juvenile court for 
adult proceedings.45 Much of this came from unrest regarding beliefs that 
the informality of the juvenile courts was inadequate to handle the violent 
juvenile offender.46 Despite continuing movements to treat more and more 
children and adolescents as adults, “the juvenile justice system remains 
unique, guided by its own philosophy and legislation and implemented by 
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its own set of agencies.”47 Juvenile court administration seeks to include 
delinquents, or children in need of intervention to prevent potentially self-
destructive behavior, as well as children in need of protection.48 
Despite criticism, it is clear that the juvenile justice system is a 
permanent fixture of the American government and a viable institution that 
“remains one of the most important social inventions of the modern 
period.”49 The need to protect the country’s children, the demands made on 
people and states to do so, and the decreasing age of first-time offenders 
emphasize the cry to strengthen the juvenile justice system.50 
C. The Expansion of Constitutional Rights to Juveniles 
Several important Supreme Court decisions have changed the way that 
juveniles are processed within the criminal system. Each decision represents 
an attempt by the Supreme Court to secure rights for juveniles that were 
ordinarily enjoyed only by adults. However, despite these advances, 
juveniles still do not enjoy the full constitutional rights that are extended to 
adults. 
1. Promising Initial Developments in In re Gault 
In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the following rights for all 
juveniles: (1) the right to notice of charges, (2) the right to counsel, (3) the 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and (4) the right to invoke 
the privilege against self-incrimination.51 This decision, In re Gault, is 
perhaps “the most noteworthy of all landmark juvenile rights cases” and 
“certainly is considered the most ambitious.”52 
Gerald Gault, at age fifteen, was committed as a “juvenile delinquent” on 
charges that he had placed an obscene phone call to a neighbor.53 After 
hearings and proceedings during which no one was sworn in, no transcript 
was made, and no memorandum of proceedings was prepared, Gault was 
committed to the Arizona State Industrial School until the age of twenty-
one, a term of six years in juvenile prison—by way of comparison, an adult 
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offender for the same crime would receive a $50 fine and no more than 
sixty days in jail.54 
Gault never had a chance to face his accuser, nor was he advised at any 
point in the process that he had the right not to make a statement.55 The 
Arizona Court of Appeals glossed over these issues, noting that the rights to 
confrontation and protection against self-incrimination had not been 
extended to “infants,” but the Supreme Court disagreed, vehemently stating 
that “[i]t would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-
incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children.”56 
The Court in Gault never addressed the issue of a juvenile’s right to a 
jury trial, nor did it address the issue of whether juveniles have a right to a 
speedy trial; however, the Court effectively managed to extend some Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment rights to the juvenile justice system.57 While it is 
hard to comprehend how the Court reconciles protecting and granting some, 
but not all, rights under the Sixth Amendment, the extension of the 
constitutional rights it did address was the first important step in moving the 
juvenile justice system forward. 
2. The Development of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: In re 
Winship 
In 1970, In re Winship established an important precedent related to the 
standard of proof used in juvenile proceedings to adjudicate guilt of a 
defendant.58 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the standard of proof in 
juvenile proceedings was to be “beyond a reasonable doubt,” which initially 
had been reserved only for adult criminal courts.59 Until the holding in 
Winship, the standard of proof in juvenile proceedings was “preponderance 
of the evidence,”60 a standard that is easier to prove. 
The Court held that the evidentiary standard in juvenile proceedings must 
align with that of adult criminal proceedings for the same policy and 
practical concerns that led courts to extend the standard to beyond a 
reasonable doubt in the first place. In criminal proceedings, when the 
692 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
defendant’s freedom and autonomy is at stake, due process requires that the 
state produce evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, both to ease the minds of 
jurors sentencing the defendant and to ensure that only the culpable are 
punished.61 The Court concluded saying, “The same considerations that 
demand extreme caution in fact finding to protect the innocent adult apply 
as well to the innocent child.”62 
In light of the Court’s obvious progression toward acceptance of full 
constitutional rights to juvenile offenders, it was somewhat surprising when, 
a mere year after Winship, and only a few years after Gault, the U.S. 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether juveniles were afforded 
constitutional protection of a trial by jury of their peers and answered with a 
decisive and resounding “no.” 
3. The End of the Expansion of Constitutional Rights: McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania 
In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court held that juveniles are not entitled to a 
jury trial as a matter of constitutional right63 and provided many reasons for 
this holding, the first of which was a general statement that the Court “has 
refrained . . . from taking the easy way with a flat holding that all rights 
constitutionally assured for the adult accused are to be imposed upon the 
state juvenile proceeding.”64 
The decision in McKevier seems to oversimplify the role that jury trials 
play in the justice system and seems to alleviate the juvenile system from 
the “burden” of a jury trial; the main concern is not with due process or 
fairness, but rather with the efficiency of proceedings.65 One assertion 
postulates that judges are more capable of correctly deciding complicated or 
technical issues and are more likely to render decisions that are predictable, 
consistent, and efficient; as such, juries are seen as unpredictable and less 
likely to understand complex issues.66 Jury trials are criticized as an 
inefficient use of judicial resources because additional time is added to the 
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proceedings for jury selection and deliberation, as well as for sidebar 
conferences and resolving evidentiary disputes.67 
The second reason the Court provided, and the one that bears the most 
weight on this article, is a cautionary and protective mechanism to preserve 
the hallmarks of the juvenile justice system. The Court cautioned that 
requiring juries in juvenile proceedings would “remake the juvenile 
proceeding into a fully adversary process and put an effective end to what 
has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal, protective 
proceeding.”68 
Moreover, the Court relied on the findings in a report created and 
produced by the Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice (hereinafter the “Commission”) before the findings in In re Gault.69 
The Court noted that “[h]ad the Commission deemed [jury trials] vital to the 
integrity of the juvenile process, or to the handling of juveniles, surely a 
recommendation or suggestion to this effect would have appeared. The 
intimations, instead, [were] quite the other way.”70 The Court’s reliance on 
the Commission’s report is misplaced. The Commission’s findings occurred 
before the developments in In re Gault. It is therefore likely that the 
Commission operated during a time when little to no constitutional rights 
had been granted to juveniles, and it is fair to understand its caution to 
extend those rights without precedent.71 
The last significant reason the Court provided in denying the extension of 
a right to juvenile jury trials is that the abuses, if any, that occurred in the 
juvenile system are not “of constitutional dimension.”72 The Court credited 
these abuses on the “lack of resources and of dedication rather than to 
inherent unfairness.”73 
Since the Court’s ruling in 1971, nearly all states adopted the holding of 
McKeiver and statutorily denied a juvenile’s right to a jury trial, and 
although it has been called into doubt in numerous cases, very few states 
have actually found that the McKeiver rule no longer applies in their current 
juvenile justice system.74 
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In juvenile proceedings, the U.S. Supreme Court has identified the 
pertinent constitutional test: “The problem is to ascertain the precise impact 
of the due process requirement upon such proceedings.”75 Since 
annunciating this “constitutional test,” courts have found a unique way in 
which the test applies to juvenile proceedings. Courts constitutionally 
protect the notice of charges, the right to confrontation and cross-
examination, the privilege against self-incrimination, and double jeopardy 
protection,76 but show a continued reluctance to recognize a jury trial as one 
of the constitutionally protected rights for juveniles. 
4. In re L.M.: A New Movement in Juvenile Justice? 
On June 20, 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court made national headlines 
when it found in favor of juvenile L.M.’s appeal on the issue of his 
constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile court. Sixteen-year-old L.M. 
was charged and prosecuted as a juvenile offender for aggravated sexual 
battery and as a minor in possession of alcohol.77 Prior to trial, L.M. 
requested a jury trial, and was denied.78 At the bench trial, L.M. was found 
guilty and sentenced as a Serious Offender I,79 with an eighteen-month 
sentence in juvenile corrections.80 The fact that L.M. was subject to a more 
criminalized offender status paved the way for his appeal, and he argued 
that the harsh effect of sentencing with the juvenile justice code in Kansas 
had so eroded the benevolence of the juvenile system that it was indistinct 
from the adult criminal justice system. 
L.M. appealed, arguing that he had a constitutional right to a jury trial 
and challenged the constitutionality of the Kansas statute which “provides 
that a juvenile who pleads not guilty is entitled to a ‘trial to the court,’ . . . 
and . . . gives the district court complete discretion in determining whether a 
juvenile should be granted a jury trial.”81 
L.M. relied on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and made three arguments on appeal: first, he claimed that the 
changes in the Kansas Juvenile Justice Code (KJJC) eroded the juvenile 
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system to the point that it was indistinguishable from the adult criminal 
system, and if he were to be treated like an adult, he should have been 
afforded full constitutional protections; second, he claimed that juveniles 
were entitled to a jury trial under the language of the Kansas Constitution; 
and third, he argued that even if juveniles were not constitutionally entitled 
to a jury, he should have been afforded one because of the seriousness of 
the offense and stigma of the sentence imposed (having to register as a sex 
offender).82 
The change that L.M. refers to is reflected in the Kansas statute which 
sets forth the purpose for the Kansas Juvenile Justice Court. This section 
currently provides that the primary goals of the juvenile justice code are “to 
promote public safety, hold juvenile offenders accountable for their 
behavior, and improve their ability to live more productively and 
responsibly in the community.”83 In 1982, when Findlay was decided, the 
KJJC was “focused on rehabilitation and the State’s parental role in 
providing guidance, control, and discipline.”84 The new language of 
“holding offenders accountable for their behavior” and lack of 
acknowledgment of a need to provide rehabilitation and guidance to young 
offenders was a primary concern of the court in addressing L.M.’s appeal. 
Acknowledging the import of McKeiver and Findlay, but realizing the 
necessary evolution of the juvenile justice system, the Kansas Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court’s ruling concluding “that the Kansas juvenile 
justice system has become more akin to an adult criminal prosecution,” and 
as a result, “juveniles have a constitutional right to a jury trial under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.”85 
II. THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN WASHINGTON STATE 
The juvenile justice system in Washington State is governed by the 
Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (RCW 13),86 which establishes a system of 
accountability and rehabilitation for juvenile offenders. Washington was the 
first, and remains the only state, to use “determinative sentencing” and a 
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sentencing grid in juvenile proceedings.87 Committed youth have 
determined minimum and maximum sentence terms; for example, fifteen to 
thirty-six weeks. Sentencing length is then determined using a point system 
based on the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s previous 
criminal history.88 Although this is the makeup of the “standard range,” 
juvenile courts and judges retain the authority to sentence outside the 
standard range through a finding of manifest injustice.89 
In contrast to Kansas, Washington has not extended the right to a jury 
trial to juveniles, despite two compelling facts: first, the Juvenile Justice Act 
was amended in 1997 to be more focused on punishment rather than 
rehabilitation; second, a recent case similarly arguing the erosion of the 
juvenile justice system was recently brought to the state supreme court. But, 
in State v. Chavez, the Washington State Supreme Court held that “[t]he 
Juvenile Justice Act requiring that cases in juvenile court be tried without a 
jury does not violate constitutional provisions for right to jury trial because 
the juvenile justice system is rehabilitative rather than retributive.”90  
Additionally, the Washington State Constitution does not guarantee 
juveniles a right to a jury trial by reason of the 1997 amendments to the 
Juvenile Justice Code. These amendments increased emphasis on 
accountability for serious offenses, while maintaining the court’s ability to 
address the unique circumstances and needs of the juvenile and retain 
access to rehabilitation rather than punishment.91 The “tough” new 160-
page juvenile justice law passed in 1997 mandated that sixteen and 
seventeen-year-old alleged offenders charged with felonies in adult court be 
given a jury trial option, but younger offenders—who may face the same 
charges in the same courts—do not get that choice.92 While the 1997 
amendments may have increased the rigidity of the Juvenile Justice Code in 
Washington State, they showed some initial promise in moving toward a 
system offering jury trial options to adolescent offenders. Unfortunately, 
“adolescence” cannot be defined with a bright line, and reform in 
Washington State, as in other states, is slow to proceed. 
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A. Baby Steps . . . Backward? 
The federal case law at this point has unabashedly extended several 
constitutional rights to juvenile defendants, therefore making no distinction 
between juveniles and adults when it comes to constitutional protections: 
“Our common criminal law did not differentiate between the adult and the 
minor who had reached the age of criminal responsibility.”93 
At the same time, when the Washington State Constitution was adopted, 
it too made no distinction between juveniles and adults regarding the 
provision of a right to a jury trial. Even after the inception of Washington’s 
juvenile court, juveniles were still statutorily entitled to a jury trial from 
1905 until 1937.94 Beginning in 1909, special provisions were being made 
in the Washington juvenile code, including the capacity statute which 
specifically contemplates that a “jury” will hear a case where a child 
between the ages of eight and twelve stands accused of committing a 
“crime.”95 Juveniles were entitled to jury trials when the Washington State 
Constitution was enacted in 1889, and they remained entitled until the 
Juvenile Justice Act was amended to repeal that right, almost forty years 
later,96 an action that certainly begs the question—why? 
Again, the rationale provided by the state is repetitive, but its words are 
insufficient to support its three-fold conclusion: first, that juvenile crimes 
are truly “non-criminal” offenses because of the nature of rehabilitation; 
second, that the court is acting in loco parentis; and finally, that 
introduction of a jury trial would disrupt this careful balance. The fear 
remains that juries are ill-equipped to handle juvenile proceedings. As a 
result, more juvenile offenders will be unfairly punished, and the aim will 
become more punitive than rehabilitative. This fear is unfounded for all 
reasons aforementioned. But of even greater necessity is the expression of 
distaste in the amendment of the Juvenile Justice Act to repeal a forty-year 
standing right—a right that, until it was repealed, had no negative history or 
problematic results, but was instead repealed under the guise of protecting 
the juvenile system. 
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Washington State is uniquely situated on this issue. The state’s 
commitment to social justice and prisoner reform in response to the over-
crowded jails and harsh punishments is a hallmark of its criminal justice 
system. Arguably, Washington has one of the strictest criminal codes of the 
country, but its activists seek to change the system into a more cost-
efficient, rehabilitative institution focused on the value of each individual to 
society. Social reform strongly seeks to incorporate rehabilitative aspects 
into all criminal proceedings, and if the movement is toward rehabilitation 
for all criminal defendants, including adults, then any concern that 
constitutional jury trial rights cannot exist with a commitment to 
rehabilitation is unsubstantiated. It is clear that adults may be provided with 
jury trials and still maintain an element of rehabilitation in sentencing—
why must juvenile proceedings be so different? 
Washington State courts have consistently relied on McKevier and prior 
state precedent in holding that juveniles do not have a constitutional right to 
a jury trial, both under the U.S. Constitution and the state constitution.97 In 
the 1999 case of In re J.H., the Washington Court of Appeals, relying on 
the state’s prior precedent, affirmed statutes denying juveniles the right to a 
jury trial, holding that such statutes do not violate the guarantees of equal 
protection under the state and federal constitutions, and that the lack of a 
jury trial supports the “unique rehabilitative nature” of juvenile 
proceedings.98  
This precedent was further affirmed by the Washington State Supreme 
Court on March 20, 2008, in a 6–3 ruling to uphold a Court of Appeals 
ruling in the case of Azel Chavez.99 Chavez was convicted in juvenile court 
on several counts, including attempted first-degree murder, first-degree 
robbery, and second-degree assault.100 In 2004, when he was fourteen, 
Chavez was accused of attempting to kill three high school football 
coaches; he then led police on a high-speed chase through three counties 
that ended when he collided with a police car on the Hood Canal Bridge.101 
He was sentenced to up to seven years in detention, with a one-year 
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enhancement for possession of a firearm.102 The seriousness of the offense 
is eerily similar to the case of In re L.M. in Kansas. Given not only the 
noxious nature of the crime, but also the harshness of the 1997 amendments 
to the Juvenile Justice Code—which, while promising rehabilitation, 
actually seek to impose greater punishment on juvenile offenders and move 
more serious juvenile offenders to the adult criminal system—Washington 
State is no longer in a position to remain juxtaposed with the decision of the 
Kansas Supreme Court. Although the Washington State Supreme Court has 
consistently accepted the argument that the Juvenile Justice Code remains 
distinct from the adult penal system, focusing more on rehabilitation than 
punishment, the dissent, led by Justice Barbara Madsen, said that, 
“recognizing a right to a trial by jury is not inconsistent with this defining 
aspect of the juvenile justice system.”103 
B. The Possibility of Advancement  
Could the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court mark a new movement 
in juvenile justice? Like the Court concluded in In re L.M., some argue that 
the juvenile system, like that in Washington State, has eroded so much that 
it is indistinguishable from the adult justice system, and that the juvenile 
justice system, while conceptually ideological, is nothing more than a 
myth.104 Proponents and creators of the juvenile justice system envisioned it 
“less like a court and more like a social welfare agency.”105 Juveniles 
brought to the attention of the juvenile court were to be helped or protected, 
rather than punished as adults.106 As stated earlier, children were not to be 
subjected “to the rigors of formal criminal trials,” but were to be handled 
informally. In exchange for this informality, they were denied certain rights 
and protections afforded to adults in formal proceedings that were deemed 
unnecessary in informal proceeding.107 
Proponents of the viewpoint that juveniles should have a constitutional 
right to a jury trial utilize the rationale that the Kansas Supreme Court used 
in In re L.M. They argue that the rehabilitative and “nurturing” ideology of 
700 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
the juvenile justice system is, in essence, nonexistent, and the movement is 
toward one criminal justice system rather than two that distinguish between 
adults and children.108 As such, constitutional protections should be 
extended to all in that justice system.109 
Conversely, proponents of the “conventional” viewpoint—that a juvenile 
does not have a constitutional right to a jury trial—believe that the very 
individualized, informal, rehabilitative approach attacked by opponents is 
the very thing worth saving about the juvenile justice system. Moreover, 
proponents argue that the inclusion of jury trial rights will interfere with the 
system’s ability to treat juveniles with compassion focusing primarily on 
rehabilitation. Proponents of this view align with the ideals of Justice 
Blackmun and the Supreme Court in McKeiver. 
Courts and commentators, however, have missed the middle ground and 
the coexistence of the two ideals. The construction of the juvenile justice 
system no longer needs to be defined by one characteristic or the other—the 
two are not mutually exclusive, but rather can and, more importantly, 
should exist simultaneously. In fact, compassion, rehabilitation, and fairness 
cannot be served in any other way. Due process requires a new juvenile 
court; compassion and a rehabilitative focus require the old court system. 
The two must find a way to meet. 
III. WHY JURY TRIALS MATTER TO SOCIETY AND TO THE 
ADOLESCENT OFFENDER 
I consider trial by jury the greatest anchor ever yet devised by 
humankind for holding a government to the principles of its constitution. 
—Thomas Jefferson, 1792 
A. Why Jury Trials Matter 
The right to a jury trial, along with the other rights encompassed in the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, make up fundamental aspects of the 
Constitution’s individual rights. Above all, this right protects offenders 
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from judicial bias and adjudicative unfairness; it is a check against state and 
judicial power. With it comes the opportunity to inject the norms and values 
of society and “reasonable” persons into the court room—norms and values 
that are sometimes lost upon the judicial system because they may be 
removed from mainstream America. A criminal defendant’s right to a jury 
trial was one of the first rights adopted from England, and remains one of 
the most valued American rights and protections.110 In fact, no country in 
the history of the world has turned to juries more than the United States.111 
Invoking juries requires that the law be explained to average individuals, 
and as a result of this historical outreach and educational effort, the 
judiciary system has been empowered, making the United States the most 
independent judiciary in the world. 112 
At the same time, the right to a trial by jury is not only a display of 
democracy to the accused, but also to the public. Serving on a jury allows 
the public to examine the judicial system and participate in its processes.113 
Moreover, jury service is a civic responsibility essential to the functioning 
of democracy, second only to voting itself.114 
Jury trials are essentially an effort to seek and determine truth. 
Throughout history, the methods utilized to determine innocence or guilt 
have been ineffective and physically unacceptable by the standards now 
recognized today; for example, an accused would often be thrown into a 
pool to see if he would sink (guilty) or float (innocent).115 Often the 
innocent were not retrieved from the water in time to ensure survival.116 
Juries bear the great burden of determining guilt and innocence—a task not 
required in any other governmental body—and simultaneously act as a 
barometer of society’s values and protection against centralized institutional 
power.117 
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B. Why Jury Trials Are Imperative for the Adolescent Offender in 
Delinquency Proceedings 
The current juvenile justice system results in juveniles “being denied 
both the protections extended to adults in the criminal system as well as the 
‘solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.’”118 The 
due process requirements in the adult criminal system are centered on 
norms of fairness; therefore, the expansion of constitutional rights to 
adolescents should not necessarily focus on the particulars of the rights the 
adult system enjoys, but rather the underlying fairness accompanying each 
right, its purpose for existence, and how such fairness can best be achieved 
for juveniles.119 McKiever, the first “no rights” decision since Gault, made 
no attempt to explain how its denial of jury trial rights fit into a coherent 
account of fairness for juveniles.120 Jury trial rights are imperative on issues 
of fairness to (1) provide a check against a judge’s abuse of discretion, (2) 
promote accurate fact finding, (3) compensate for potentially ineffective or 
inadequate counsel, and (4) provide legitimacy to the proceeding.121 
1. Jury Trials Provide a Check Against Unbridled Judicial Discretion122 
One overriding quality of the juvenile justice system is that decisions as 
to guilt, innocence, and appropriate sentencing are in the hands of a single 
judge. This principle, however, relies on the assumption that juvenile court 
judges will not be clouded by their own biases and prejudices, and that they 
are capable of consistently delivering fair dispositions.123 One commentator 
noted, “Although judges are certainly capable of adjudicating juvenile 
procedures in a fair manner, only a jury could ensure that an adolescent is 
protected from a judge who is overburdened, or even worse, jaded.”124 
Judges may be unfairly impartial for several reasons, including familiarity 
with a defendant from previous appearances, damaging evidence, or 
previous decisions on similar charges.125 
Juries in adult proceedings were originally constructed to ensure fairness 
by placing a check on a judge’s unbridled discretion. Because judges alone 
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decide the fate of the child, all safeguards to ensuring fairness should be 
imposed. If part of the original purpose of juries was to mitigate the plenary 
power that judges exercise to increase the probability of a fair result, then it 
would seem absurd that the same protection is unnecessary in juvenile 
proceedings.126 
2. Jury Trials Promote Accurate Fact Finding and Discovery of 
Truth127 
A jury trial is necessary in juvenile delinquency proceedings in order to 
ensure accurate and fair fact finding. Studies have shown that judges and 
juries can reach opposing verdicts, even when presented with the same 
evidence.128 Fact finding by a jury is necessarily a more reasoned process 
than fact finding by an individual, because the defendant, case, evidence, 
and facts are viewed by multiple people who must reach a consensus of 
guilt in order to convict, ensuring that very few evidentiary questions and 
facts go unanswered or unaddressed.129 
At the same time, juries fill the gap that likely exists between an adult 
judge and an adolescent offender, particularly because juries are a cross 
section of society, and therefore, representative of the entire population. 
Similarly, the potential addition of Youth Advisory Juries to traditional 
juvenile juries (a concept discussed later in this article) would assist in 
additional communion between the two.130 Most importantly, however, 
juries provide a very human element to fact finding and adjudication of 
guilt or innocence because they incorporate common sense, community 
standards, and human emotion that can potentially be lost in a legal 
proceeding.131 
3. Jury Trials Compensate for Unfairness of Potentially Inadequate 
Counsel132 
Many proponents of juvenile jury trial rights argue that protection and 
fairness provided by a jury is necessary because the juvenile justice system 
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is becoming characteristically equated with inadequate defense counsel.133 
Adolescents often receive subpar legal counsel in comparison to the 
representation in adult proceedings because juvenile defense lawyers are 
often overworked and undersupervised.134 
Complications arising from juvenile representation further affect a 
defense counselor’s ability to advocate for his or her client. Such 
complications include the tenuous psychological divide between being a 
protector of an adolescent’s legal rights and being a guardian-like figure 
acting in the juvenile’s best interest, as well as balancing conscious or 
subconscious disapproval of the juvenile’s behavior.135 
4. Jury Trials Provide Legitimacy to the Proceeding from the 
Adolescent’s Perspective136 
Jury trials may serve to legitimize the proceeding in the eyes of the 
adolescent; without them, the adolescent likely feels he or she was not 
afforded the same rights that others similarly situated were, and treatment 
was therefore unfair. This concept of “procedural fairness” plays a critical 
role in understanding why people obey the law, the cognitive and emotional 
development of adolescents to obey the law, and the rates of adolescent 
recidivism, discussed in greater detail below. At the same time, 
participation in the legal process, the very foundation upon which jury trials 
were constructed, empowers adolescents to take an element of 
responsibility and involvement in their ultimate fate—an aspect painfully 
missing from the current juvenile system. The perceptions of fairness, 
impartiality, and involvement that adolescents are likely to feel in a jury 
trial proceeding will only serve to heighten rehabilitation and accountability 
for their wrong act.137 
To deny any criminal defendant, regardless of his or her age, the right to 
a jury trial is truly a denial of a fundamental constitutional right. Courts and 
commentators have cited numerous reasons for concern in denying 
juveniles the right to a jury trial, but what is being masked by their concern 
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is an overall feeling of inefficiency. Courts are looking to take the “easy 
way out.”138 Jury trials are long and often inefficient procedures, but they 
are of such critical importance that the juvenile system should not be 
“protected” from their shortcomings. The right to a jury trial is of even 
greater importance in the juvenile arena because of the courts’ and society’s 
inability to relate to its youth, particularly its adolescent offenders.   
Clearly, it is not unprecedented to extend the right to a jury trial to 
juvenile offenders, and it would not even be far from the scope of other 
constitutional rights now active in the juvenile justice system. But that is not 
to say that it would be without its difficulties and issues, the most salient of 
which will likely be: who makes up the jury? As we will explore later in the 
article, this may not be as big of a hurdle as once believed. 
IV. WHY REHABILITATION MATTERS TO THE ADOLESCENT 
OFFENDER AND WHY IT SHOULD BE MAINTAINED 
The progressive attitude that conceived of the juvenile court system did 
so because of the unique aspect and position of juveniles in this society. 
Juveniles, for better or worse, are in an extremely different position than 
adults, in both maturity (physical, cognitive, and emotional) and in the 
capacity to learn, grow, and change—a capacity that, we as adults know, 
becomes increasingly difficult with age. The issue is not whether to 
eliminate the juvenile court system altogether—to do so would be foolish 
and treat minors, who are deservedly distinguishable from adults, with exact 
similarity. This section examines the psychology behind why people obey 
the law, the important distinction between children and adults, the danger of 
losing the adolescent in a dichotomous system, and why methods of 
rehabilitation remain crucial for teens. 
A. Why People Obey the Law and the Theory of Procedural Justice 
Procedural justice theory is the notion that people are more likely to obey 
the law and comply with generally accepted social policy if they believe 
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that the procedures utilized by the justice system are fair, unbiased, and 
efficient.139 This theory is relevant to a juvenile’s right to a jury trial 
because, if the juvenile feels that the process with which he was sentenced 
was unfair, he may be less likely to respect the law, leading to higher 
recidivism rates. Several empirical studies, conducted by Tom Tyler and 
others, suggest that people obey the law when the rules and procedures are 
consistent with their personal attitudes and values.140 That is, when people 
are personally committed to obeying the law, they voluntarily assume the 
obligation to do so, irrespective of the risk of punishment.141 People care 
enormously about process and greatly value the opportunity to be heard in 
an official and unofficial capacity, regardless of the outcome of that fact 
finding.142 Tyler’s research further suggests that the behavior of and 
processes used by police officers and judges—if perceived by the alleged 
offender to be fair, unbiased, and benevolent—can encourage voluntary 
acceptance of and compliance with decisions made by legal authorities.143 
Such voluntary acceptance of the rules and norms of society can thus lead to 
lower rates of reoffending.144 According to Tyler, “one’s sense of obligation 
to a certain set of rules is the key element in the concept of legitimacy, as it 
leads to voluntary deference.”145 
The benefits of a self-regulating and voluntary justice system are 
innumerable, in terms of cost and efficiency, and value to the offender.146 
Empirical evidence supports the notion that forced compliance and coercion 
as a means to shape individual and societal behavior is costly in terms of 
staffing, time, and resources.147 Although Tyler’s research has focused 
primarily on adult populations, the influence of legitimacy and personal 
morality on child development and juvenile delinquency has been examined 
in several studies, which lay the groundwork for further exploration of the 
effect of self-regulation on adolescent recidivism rates.148 Studies suggest 
that adolescents who display “higher stages of moral reasoning” are less 
likely to engage in delinquent behavior or reoffend because of feelings of 
personal commitment rather than pressure to conform.149 Moreover, “the 
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evidence presented . . . suggests that constraint between reported 
noncompliance with laws and affective-evaluative orientations toward the 
law, legal authorities, and legal institutions tends to be greater among 
individuals to whom law is more salient than among those to whom law is 
less salient.”150 
B. The Important Distinction Between Childhood and Adolescence and the 
Intersection of Procedural Justice on Adolescent Behavior and 
Recidivism Rates 
The picture of the legal construction of childhood aligns closely with our 
notions of childhood in society—children are innocent beings, incapable of 
making competent decisions, and in need of care and protection; it is this 
social construct of childhood that has generated much of the legal policy 
aimed at juveniles.151 In reality, however, the legal notion of childhood is 
far more complex, and policy makers, who seem capable of discerning a 
young child from an adult, have proven incapable of any social construction 
for adolescence, classifying these individuals as children or as adults, 
without a clear image of the uniqueness of this growth phase in a young 
person’s life.152 
Much of the legal theory and policy that drives societal decisions are 
based on immaturity of the child. Children are dependent on adults and the 
state for survival, basic needs, and education that will allow them to become 
mature adults.153 Moreover, children may lack the capacity to make sound 
decisions because of the cognitive immaturity of their age. This leads to the 
belief that others should protect children from undue influence they may 
feel as a result of their dependence on society.154 As a result of this societal 
image, children are assumed to be inherently different than adults—
cognitively, emotionally, physically, psychologically—and therefore, 
“values of autonomy, responsibility, and liberty simply do not apply to 
them.”155 
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1. The Legal Socialization and Interaction of Adolescents with the 
Legal System 
Adolescence complicates the legal construction of childhood. Teens are 
somewhat of a lost generation in the legal system; no one would propose 
that an adolescent and a toddler are similar in their reasoning, cognitive 
ability, or emotional maturity, and because of that, “the presumptions of 
developmental immaturity that shape the legal account of childhood do not 
fit comfortably with conventional images of adolescence.”156 Conventional 
wisdom, however, supports the notion that adolescents, though distinct from 
children, are not fully formed adults. Many are still dependent on their 
parents or the state financially, emotionally, or physically, and this age is 
particularly vulnerable to immature decisionmaking and negative peer 
pressure.157 Because the law and society often fear the instability of this 
particular group of juveniles, ease and efficiency support categorizing them 
either as children or as adults, thus ignoring this very unique developmental 
stage of growth.158 
Behavioral psychologists studying adolescent populations and their 
interactions with the legal system generally focus their research on a 
question closely related to why people obey the law, discussed in depth 
above. Their research focuses more on the factors that shape adolescent 
criminal behavior that are often far more involved than mere maturation and 
psychological development.159 An adolescent’s “legal socialization” is not a 
static process between childhood and adulthood; it is ever-developing and 
evolving and is heavily influenced by one’s peers, family unit, and 
neighborhood culture.160 Similarly, an adolescent’s law-related behavior is 
shaped by a myriad of factors, including legitimacy of the legal process and 
authority figures, an obligation to obey the law from a normative 
perspective, and personal legal cynicism.161 
Specifically, research has found that an adolescent’s perception of fair 
procedures is based upon the degree to which the adolescent was given the 
opportunity to be heard in a judicial setting; the neutrality, quality, and 
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benevolence of the fact-finding process as well as whether the adolescent 
was treated with respect and politeness.162 Procedural justice directly affects 
an adolescent’s compliance with the law and similarly affects whether an 
adolescent views the law, authoritarian figures, and legal institutions as 
legitimate.163 Empirically, a causal relationship thus exists between an 
adolescent’s perceptions of procedural fairness and the likelihood that the 
adolescent will initially encounter the legal system or later reoffend. 
2. The Causal Connection Between Legal Socialization, Procedural 
Fairness, and Adolescent Recidivism Rates 
New social science research focusing on whether a causal connection 
exists between procedural justice and rates of juvenile recidivism has found 
that the causal connection between the two is not outcome dependent.164 An 
adolescent was less likely to reoffend because he deemed the procedure 
“fair” (and therefore legitimate) rather than because of a positive or 
negative outcome in his adjudication.165 
At the same time, research indicates a link between an adolescent’s 
capacity to take responsibility for his actions and his ability and willingness 
to participate in the legal process and rehabilitative services.166 The 
connection between an adolescent’s mental, emotional, and cognitive 
development and his sense of accountability and cooperation with 
rehabilitation is also relevant in contexts outside the criminal arena. For 
example, in the civil context, an adolescent’s development and his sense of 
cooperation is pertinent when commitment or inpatient treatment is a 
consideration; an adolescent is more likely to cooperate with therapeutic 
measures if he has ownership in and respect for the decision-making 
process.167 Evidence suggests that allowing adolescents to direct their own 
care in the therapeutic or medical context enhances the ultimate effect and 
success of their rehabilitation.168 Such an examination “highlights the 
importance of ensuring that juveniles have the opportunity for meaningful 
and knowing participation in the legal system.”169 Such meaningful and 
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knowing participation increases the likelihood that an adolescent will deem 
the procedure “fair,” and decreases the rates of adolescent recidivism. Such 
involvement also promotes success in an adolescent offender’s 
rehabilitation and reintegration into society, an important concept of child 
welfare in the juvenile justice system further discussed below. 
3. Slipping Through the Cracks 
Adolescents are neither adults nor children, and in a dichotomous legal 
system, they seem to fall through the cracks by being denied access to both 
groups’ protections and rights.170 Children cross the line to legal adulthood 
at different rates and in different stages, yet the law provides no clear 
distinction of age at which to consider a child an adult. For example, at age 
ten, a youth charged with murder may be tried as an adult in many states, 
and high school students have rights of political expression protected by the 
First Amendment.171 However, young adults cannot consent to most 
medical procedures, including abortion or sterilization, cannot vote until age 
eighteen, and cannot consume alcohol until age twenty-one, three years 
after they are able to enter the armed forces.172 The logic that divides this 
boundary is far from obvious. 
During the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, legal policy makers 
ignored adolescence and continued to shift the boundary between childhood 
and adulthood depending on the policy goal at stake.173 More bluntly, 
“American law embodies an informal legal presumption that adolescents are 
children, subject to a fair number of exceptions. . . . It has not worked well 
in juvenile justice policy, where the simplistic categorization . . . has 
undermined our ability to achieve a viable, effective, and human juvenile 
justice approach.”174 
The social aspects forming legal policy around the juvenile court system 
present unique challenges in attending to adolescence as a distinct 
developmental stage between childhood and adulthood. Only after the court 
started extending rights to juveniles was this distinction acknowledged and 
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aided. Legal definitions have too long ignored the transitional stage between 
childhood and adulthood. Individually placing adolescents into either 
category based on maturity or culpability has serious consequences, because 
these adolescents are neither innocent children nor blameworthy adults.175 
In her book about the legal construction of childhood, Elizabeth Scott 
suggests that “policies that fail to acknowledge this are unlikely to serve the 
public interest or that of young offenders.”176 
In the juvenile justice system, the goals of providing youth welfare and 
welfare for society have been treated as irreconcilable.177 Juvenile courts 
have proven to be an arena where the dichotomy between childhood and 
adulthood, and the absence of recognition of adolescence, leads to 
ineffective policies and subpar approaches for handling youth offenders.178 
The gradual expansion of constitutional protections and rights to juveniles 
has proven an effective means of respecting the uniqueness of the 
adolescent who is neither an adult nor a child.179 In order to ensure that 
protection remains for these unique individuals, courts must continue to 
adapt and extend rights to adolescents as necessary to account for the 
differences between a child offender, an adolescent, and an adult. 
C. Maintaining Models of Rehabilitation and Therapeutic Jurisprudence for 
Adolescents 
The early juvenile court was so entrenched in ideals of rehabilitation that 
blameworthiness and responsibility had no place in its nurturing model.180 
But as juvenile crime increased, particularly in the age group that most 
social psychologists refer to as adolescence (ages twelve to eighteen), a cry 
came for juvenile reform. Proponents of transferring adolescent offenders to 
adult courts called for adult penalties, insisting that adolescents are more 
mature and more responsible than children, and therefore more culpable and 
blameworthy.181 In the justice system—all things being equal—the more 
noxious the crime, the greater the punishment; but all things are not equal 
when comparing adolescent and adult crime.182 Adolescents are more able 
712 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
to change and adapt than adults and have a greater emotional, mental, and 
cognitive ability to change than adults. Because of this, the role 
rehabilitation plays in the juvenile justice system is critical to its ability to 
achieve adolescent compliance and reduced recidivism rates. 
The issue of handling adolescent crime has sharply divided American 
society, mostly because people neither expect adolescents to be criminals, 
nor do they anticipate them to commit such radically violent crimes.183 
Because this dilemma forced policymakers to define childhood and criminal 
activity along a continuum rather than a bright line, two ideologies 
prevailed. First, already discussed at length, adolescents have different 
competencies than adults and thus should be treated differently than adults. 
Second, adolescents have a different potential for change than adults; 
therefore, the justice system should focus on the rehabilitation of young 
offenders rather than the strict punishment associated with adult 
proceedings.184 
It has been postulated that rehabilitative goals have a place and role in 
adult criminal justice, but these goals have an even more important role in 
juvenile criminal justice, especially to adolescents because of the enormous 
cognitive and emotional growth and maturation they experience during this 
period.185 Adolescents are particularly malleable, often influenced heavily 
by parents, peers, schools, and other settings. Given this malleability and 
potential for change not associated with adulthood, “transferring juveniles 
into a criminal justice system that precludes a rehabilitative response may 
not be very sensible public policy” and may actually allow society to 
relinquish children for whom there is hope.186 Adolescence is also a time 
when emotional, intellectual, and social habits become engrained and 
endure into the adolescent’s adult life. Therefore, “adoption of the 
rehabilitative stance toward juvenile offenders is not only especially 
appropriate but also especially consequential.”187 
Bad decisions about juvenile justice policy and punishment may have 
cumulative consequences for the adolescent that are difficult, if not 
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impossible, to later undo.188 Social psychologists acknowledge that 
adolescents, more than children, must make mistakes in order to learn, and 
as such, they are prime candidates for rehabilitation if done correctly.189 
Adolescent offenders should be sentenced to special facilities that avoid the 
brutality of adult prisons and address the special needs of a young adult, 
including education, vocational training, and nutritional needs.190 “Adult 
correctional facilities rarely address rehabilitative goals with adult 
offenders. They are even more poorly suited to address the special 
rehabilitative needs and opportunities posed by juvenile offenders.”191 
Additionally, imposing long, harsh, punitive sentences carries different 
implications when the offender is an adolescent or child than when the 
offender is an adult.192 
At the same time, adopting a rehabilitative approach for adolescent 
offenders does not mean that punishment has no merit and should not be 
used. Instead, it means that adolescent offenders “should be punished and 
held responsible within a system designed to treat children, not fully mature 
adults.”193 Research suggests that rehabilitation is the “most reasonable 
course of action for juvenile offenders, not only because they are less 
culpable, but also because as their brains are developing they are especially 
amenable to learning how to behave properly.”194 Adolescents, because 
their brains are not fully developed, cannot fully think through and 
contemplate the consequences of their actions. If premeditative thought is 
not inherently present in the adolescent brain, then deterrence is ineffective, 
and society’s goal should be assisting the adolescent in becoming a fully 
functioning member of society.195 
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V. EXPANDING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND EXPLORING 
REHABILITATION: HOW TEEN COURTS AND YOUTH ADVISORY 
JURIES MAY BE USED AS MODELS IN JUVENILE JURY RIGHTS 
REFORM 
The vision behind teen court programs, including Washington State’s 
teen court program, is to utilize positive peer pressure, self-determination, 
ownership, and responsibility in juvenile proceedings for misdemeanors to 
encourage participation and reduce recidivism rates. The well-established 
foundation laid by teen court programs can further be channeled into 
potential Youth Advisory Juries, which can act as a stepping stone to full 
integration of jury trial rights for juveniles. 
A. What are Teen Courts? 
Teen courts are a division within several juvenile court systems. 
Although they utilize court-like procedures, they are essentially teen 
diversion programs196 that are typically offered to first-time misdemeanor 
offenders, often charged with traffic offenses, assault, possession of alcohol, 
theft, disorderly conduct, or truancy.197 
Predecessors to modern teen courts appeared at least sixty years ago. The 
modern idea of teen courts started to take shape in the 1970s and 
experienced a particular boom of popularity in the mid- to late-1990s, due 
particularly to financial support from the Justice Department’s Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).198 Currently, more 
than eight hundred teen courts operate nationwide, with many more in the 
planning stages.199 Paula A. Nessel of the American Bar Association notes 
that “their rapid growth is compelling evidence that they are fulfilling a 
recognized need.”200 Teen courts provide a voluntary alternative to the 
traditional juvenile justice system for offenders charged with less serious 
crimes. Proceedings mirror those of a traditional court, but typically, the 
jury, prosecutor, defense counsel, bailiff, and clerk are all youths in an 
almost entirely youth-run courthouse.201 Currently, in most teen courts, 
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young offenders are referred to the program for sentencing after admitting 
to the charges against them. In most courts, teens are not responsible for 
adjudicating guilt or innocence (although a few programs utilize this 
approach).202 
The extent of youth responsibility in any given teen court program 
depends heavily on the model being implemented.203 In general, teen court 
models are grouped into four basic categories: adult judge, youth judge, 
youth tribunal, and peer jury.204 Adult judge and peer jury models most 
closely mirror typical court proceedings. The adult judge model is similar to 
the youth judge model, except that a figure from the legal community 
(usually a volunteer attorney or retired judge) acts as the judge and manages 
courtroom dynamics.205 
The youth tribunal model eliminates the jury from the proceedings and 
instead consists of a panel of youth judges that hear cases presented by 
youth attorneys.206 The peer jury model closely aligns with a grand jury. 
Youth juries question defendants directly after the case is presented by 
youth or adult attorneys.207 All youth models maximize youth involvement 
because both require that teens are involved in and perform all necessary 
roles.208 
Philosophically, teen courts embrace the hallmarks associated with the 
juvenile justice system, including providing rehabilitative qualities for the 
defendant, victim, and community as they all collaborate to resolve the 
dispute.209 At the same time, teen court jury trials are similar to the adult 
process. Judi Bertrand, an adult judge who oversees teen court proceedings 
in Texas, notes: “To have to get up there and testify makes them more 
nervous. This is better than just paying a fine, because they have to take 
responsibility.”210 
B. Washington State’s Teen Court Program 
Washington State is home to over thirty teen court offshoots, including 
teen courts in Bellingham, Lake Forest Park, Auburn, Kirkland, Port 
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Angeles, and Issaquah.211 The oldest teen court in Washington State is in 
Issaquah and was created in the 1960s.212 The most nationally recognized 
and visible teen court in the state, however, is the Whatcom County Teen 
Court, located in Bellingham. 
The Whatcom County Teen Court was created in 1998 as a result of 
discussion between the Superior Court Commissioner who was assigned to 
juvenile offenses that year and Northwest Youth Services.213 Discussions 
centered on new methods for providing community service to juvenile 
offenders, offering them a way to constructively give back to their 
community, shortening the time needed to resolve charges, and reinforcing 
the need for individual responsibility and responsibility to the 
community.214 Whatcom County Teen Court cases are traditionally heard in 
front of a jury of high school students who are charged with determining the 
defendant’s penalties.215 Because of its commitment to rehabilitation of 
adolescent offenders, the Whatcom County Teen Court has received the 
Liberty Bell Award from the Whatcom County Bar Association, as well as 
the Ken Grass Founders Award from the Whatcom County Commission on 
Children and Youth.216  
According to a Washington State study by the U.S. Department of 
Justice, adolescents whose cases are heard in Washington teen courts have 
only a 6 percent recidivism rate, compared to an 18 percent recidivism rate 
for juvenile cases heard in traditional courts.217 At the same time, 
Washington State taxpayers save over ninety-two thousand dollars for each 
case that is diverted from traditional courts to state teen courts.218 
Collectively, Washington State approached its commitment to teen courts 
in a unique manner.219 The Council on Public Legal Education—which is 
housed inside the Washington State Bar Association—is committed to “the 
education of the people of Washington about their legal rights and 
responsibilities in order to help them participate effectively in a democracy 
and in the justice system.”220 Because of the value that youth courts were 
shown to have on educating volunteers and offenders about the law and the 
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consequences of their actions, the council launched a statewide campaign to 
strengthen existing youth courts and create new youth courts.221 
C. How Teen Courts May Act as a Stepping Stone for Jury Trial Integration 
Without Impinging on the Uniqueness of the Juvenile Justice System 
Teen courts were developed as a community-based approach to the 
problem of adolescent crime.222 The guiding principle of teen courts is that 
youth are more responsive to the disapproval of their peers than to 
disapproval of authority and the legal system.223 Although teen courts 
across the country utilize different approaches, what seems to be consistent 
throughout is the imposition of sentences by youth juries.224 
The developers of teen courts strongly believe that, because an 
adolescent’s cognitive and emotional development (or lack thereof) makes 
them particularly susceptible to peer-influence, courts where teens are able 
to question and confront one another on peer delinquent behavior have a 
powerful rehabilitative effect.225 Teen courts, therefore, attempt to harness 
peer pressure and use the influence of peers in a positive manner, namely as 
a deterrent for future crime.226 
Additionally, many—if not all—adolescent defendants going through the 
teen court system are required to serve a term as a jury member for other 
youth offenders.227 Because of this requirement, teen courts are thought to 
have a beneficial social and educational effect on teens and assist in 
reintegrating delinquent youth back into society.228 The goal of teen courts 
is ultimately rehabilitative with respect to teen defendants (a hallmark of 
juvenile proceedings), while requiring acknowledgment of responsibility (a 
hallmark of adult proceedings).229 
For too long, adolescents have had the worst of both worlds—adult 
protections are not extended to them because they are not adults, but 
childhood rehabilitative foci are ignored because they are not children.230 
The difficulty in creating policy that expands the teen court model is that 
the program is generally limited to minor crimes committed by first-time 
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offenders.231 It has yet to be seen how a youth court would respond to major 
felony cases or the imposition of sentences of incarceration.232 
Additionally, several questions inevitably arise regarding expansion of 
this model into full jury trial rights for adolescent defendants. Clearly, 
“teens could not be the principle participants or decision makers” in 
juvenile jury trials for many of the same reasons that they should not be 
treated as adults—cognitively and emotionally they cannot and should not 
be expected to adjudicate cases unsupervised because they lack the 
educational and life experiences that make this possible for adults.233 
However, this should not discount the role that teens could play in ordinary 
juvenile court proceedings and potential jury trials. Youth Advisory Juries 
may act as the step needed to integrate rehabilitative teen court models into 
full jury trials for adolescent offenders. 
Youth Advisory Juries could be comprised of six to eight members, many 
of whom could be conditionally released juveniles serving probationary 
sentences.234 In this sense, selection of adolescent jurors would more closely 
align with selection of jurors in teen courts, rather than traditional selection 
of adult jurors who are called to serve via summons and are selected only 
after a lengthy questioning process by case counsel. As opposed to acting 
on their own volition, the teen jurors would merely comprise a part of an 
otherwise traditional jury; that is, jury selection and the role of the jury 
would be identical to adult proceedings, save for the presence of six to eight 
teen jurors assisting in the proceedings. Taking a cue from teen courts, these 
Youth Advisory Juries should be allowed to make comments, ask questions 
of the judge and other jury members, and witness adjudication of guilt or 
innocence. Under an approach like this, the court and the jury do not lose 
their actual authority as a decision-making body.235 A traditional jury would 
still determine guilt or innocence; however, youth involvement makes the 
process less adversarial and more aligned with “peer review” associated 
with adult jury trials. At the same time, forcing a teen to face his or her 
peers will have tremendous rehabilitative aspects (as seen from teen court 
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models) and still serve the needs of the adult justice system, that is, 
constitutionally protected rights and offender responsibility. Additionally, 
the teens serving on the Youth Advisory Jury, many of whom were 
offenders themselves, will be provided with a unique perspective of real 
adjudications, which may serve as a deterrent or preventative tool for the 
youth juror himself as his empathy and institutional understanding 
increase.236 
The creation of Youth Advisory Juries should be given serious 
consideration as a role in jury trials for juvenile proceedings. The strong 
success of teen courts suggests that adolescents should play a role in 
adjudications.237 The most logical place to employ Youth Advisory Juries is 
in a state like Washington, where successful teen courts are already 
operating, and social activism remains focused on rehabilitation for criminal 
defendants.238 If states can shift their focus to the idea that a juvenile’s 
constitutional rights can be protected while simultaneously upholding 
values of rehabilitation, then juvenile adjudication may adopt a more 
holistic, constitutionally appropriate approach to treatment of adolescents. 
It is crucial that all states, especially Washington State, with its unique 
opportunity for employment of Youth Advisory Juries, recognize the 
democratic values and fundamental fairness that make extension of 
constitutional rights to all adolescents imperative. The foundation of this 
country did not distinguish between adults and children for the purpose of 
constitutional rights, and neither did the Washington State Constitution 
when it was adopted. Courts are ill-placed to decide, years later, that such a 
right never existed. Courts are essentially picking and choosing the rights 
they deem “appropriate” for juveniles under the guise of protecting the 
careful balance between punishment and rehabilitation. 
CONCLUSION 
The sad truth is that our society greatly undervalues young people. 
Adolescents comprise a group of individuals that adults fear and fear for; 
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the result is a standstill on how to promote their wellbeing. Simply put, we 
have stopped caring enough to continue moving forward. We must 
constantly experiment, evaluate, and rethink matters if we wish to 
contribute meaningfully to the definition of “what works” in juvenile court 
adjudication.239 “Although American public rhetoric may suggest that we 
cherish the young, the minuscule amount of government resources 
dedicated to programs dealing with children’s issues demonstrates that the 
problems of the young are a low social priority.”240 
Without restoration of several constitutional rights to the juvenile justice 
system, adolescents are easy prey for a system that does not seem to know 
where they best belong. We cannot dismiss the juvenile justice system as 
moot or mythical, because the rehabilitative focus of this system has proven 
beneficial. Unless courts are willing to begin to view an adolescent as 
deserving of constitutional protections, how can courts truly protect the best 
interests of the juvenile? How does a court system that systematically 
denies juveniles their constitutional rights, while at the same time attempts 
to protect them, ever operate to its fullest capacity? The bottom line is that it 
cannot. In the same way that the adult criminal justice system cannot 
operate fairly and efficiently without constitutional considerations, neither 
can the juvenile system. To suggest anything else would be to say that 
juvenile offenders are less deserving of the very due process and equal 
protection clauses that this country was founded on. 
Jury trials are necessary for juvenile offenders so that they may protect 
themselves from being subjected to biases, in the same way that jury trials 
protect adults in adult proceedings. Because adolescents are a uniquely 
malleable group, using a youth jury may steer peer pressure in positive, 
rehabilitative ways that make adolescents accountable to their communities. 
It is time that adolescents have a place in the American legal system. 
Because adolescents are neither adults nor children, the gap created 
simultaneously removes childhood compassion and adult constitutional 
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protections. If we don’t mind the gap, we risk losing this incredibly 
vulnerable group. 
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